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I.  Introduction 
In many states, small businesses are the engines of the economy.  In those states, 
small businesses create the bulk of new jobs, not only through their start-up, but also 
through their continuous growth.  The rate of their growth, if they are successful, is 
significantly higher than the rate of growth of larger business enterprises. 
 In other nations, small businesses do not contribute a similar amount, either to the 
gross domestic product or to job growth and creation.  In those states, although large 
numbers of small businesses are created, they usually are limited in size to two to four 
employees.  When they get to that size, they seem to stop growing.  In large part, this is a 
financing problem.  A small business can grow to two or four employees based on family 
savings but further growth in size and employment often requires financing from outside 
the family – i.e., financing from a commercial lender. 
If the small business owner also owns land, he can raise such financing by placing 
a mortgage (hypotec) on the land.  But, the land-owning aristocracy is not usually a 
hotbed of entrepreneurial drives and skill.  What can entrepreneurs in the rest of the 
population do to raise the necessary financing?  In too many cases, commercial lenders 
will not grant “signature loans” to the landless, and those borrowers are forced to turn to 
the illegal loan market (“loan sharks”).  Fees or interest rates from such lenders are too 
high to permit slow and steady growth, and such interest rates increase the likelihood of 
business failure. 
 What can be done to induce commercial lenders to provide small businesses with 
the financing they need?  In many systems, the answer is to provide such lenders with 
collateral which is not land.   Although the drafters of the Napoleonic Code considered 
moveables and intangibles to be “lesser assets,” and therefore not a source for significant 
financing, the world has changed enormously since that determination was made.  Banks 
in the Midwest in the U.S. find that cattle make better collateral than farmland.  The 
cattle can be sold in three to seven days for 95% of their market value; while the bank 
may wait for months to find a suitable buyer for farmland, and the price will depend on 
the number of potential buyers.  World Bank studies show that a nation’s capital can be 
increased by 60% if a commercially effective financing system can be developed which 
uses movables and intangibles as collateral for loans. 
 What is needed to provide such a commercially effective secured financing 
system which uses moveables as collateral?  The basic economic definition is that the 
collateral must have sufficient economic value to a potential secured creditor to induce 
that creditor either (1) to give credit at a preferential rate for fees or interest or; (2) to 
make more credit available than the creditor would have granted if the loan was 
unsecured.  In many legal regimes, creditors take security on all loans, but consider the 
collateral to have no actual economic value.  In such loans, the fee structure or interest 
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rate is the same as it would have been for unsecured credit, instead of being lower; and 
the amount available is also the same, so there is no benefit to the debtor from its grant of 
the collateral. 
 Thus, the conduct sought by society from a potential secured creditor is not 
merely that it receives a benefit by taking an interest in the collateral.  Instead, the 
conduct sought by society is that a potential secured creditor gives benefits to the debtor 
in return for obtaining its interest in the collateral. 
 Whether the system created is effective or ineffective will depend upon whether 
creditors perceive that secured loans involve significantly less risk that the loan funds 
will be lost.  That perception, in turn, depends upon whether the creditor determines that 
it will receive adequate protection from the collateral, or from the proceeds of the sale of 
the collateral, if the debtor cannot make the payments after appraising the market value of 
the collateral.  The creditor makes this determination by: 1) determining the cost of 
obtaining protection; 2) determining the cost of enforcing his interest; 3) determining 
how much of that value will be obtained by sale of the collateral after default; and 4) 
determining whether and how much of that value will be paid to the secured creditor – 
i.e., whether any other creditors can assert claims which will have priority to the 
collateral or its proceeds.  If the creditor believes that only 10% of the appraised value of 
the collateral will be paid to it through the sale process, it will require the debtor to put up 
collateral worth ten times the amount of the loan before considering the collateral to have 
any value to it.  Only then will the creditor determine that the collateral gives enough 
protection from risk of non-payment to reduce the interest rate charged.  And finally, 5) 
the potential secured creditor will want to know, before it makes the loan, whether its 
interests are protected from, and take priority over, the claims of the third parties both 
before and after any default by the debtor. 
 There are basically three legal regimes which furnish models of laws designed to 
promote the use of moveables and intangibles to finance small businesses.  One is the 
“nantissement de fonds de commerce,” a device used in the French law which creates a 
mortgage on a business – or at least some parts of it.  The second is the “registered 
charge” of the European Bank’s ”Model Law on Secured transactions,” which is modeled 
in large part on the  English financing device called a “floating charge.”  The third is the 
North American “security interest” used in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in 
the U.S., and in the Personal Property Security Acts in Canada. 
II.  The Financing Needs of a Small Business 
What moveable and intangible assets does a small business have which can be 
used to provide collateral?  More importantly, what assets could a small business obtain 
on credit, if financing were available, which it cannot afford to acquire for cash?  Small 
businesses have a range of assets, which include equipment, inventory, accounts and 
intellectual property (trademark, copy rights, and sometimes patents).  The small business 
may also have real estate.  If so, it may be able to raise sufficient financing through a real 
estate mortgage. 
 If equipment can be purchased on credit, the small business can modernize more 
quickly than if it must wait to purchase for cash.  If the equipment can be purchased on 
secured credit, World Bank studies show that the financing will be more easily available 
and the cost to the small business will be significantly lower than for unsecured 
financing.  If secured financing is available only from the seller of the equipment, 
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however, the seller’s monopoly position as a secured financing will erode much of the 
savings to equipment purchaser.  Thus, it is important that equipment financing be 
available from both equipment sellers and from other, more general, commercial lenders. 
 The same analysis applies to purchases of inventory.  Again, it is important that 
inventory financing be available from both the providers of the inventory (trade creditors) 
and from lenders. 
 Small businesses often find that their sales increase markedly if they sell to their 
customers on credit.  Sometimes, they go through the formalities of selling using a 
security device, such as retaining title until they are paid.  However, more often, they sell 
more simply on “open account” believing that they know their customers well enough to 
guarantee payment.  In either case, there is a limiting principle on how much selling on 
credit they can do, because the proceeds of the sale are needed to replenish the inventory 
sold.  Unless the small business has a reservoir of cash, replenishment of inventory can 
be done only when the business has realized cash from the sale of prior inventory.  Thus, 
the ability of a small business to sell on credit of any kind is dependent upon its ability to 
raise money on the accounts generated by cash sales.  The amount of cash generated by a 
sale or financing of accounts will depend upon whether the buyer or financer of the 
accounts believes that its interests will be securely protected against the account debtor 
and third parties. 
III.  Nantissement de Fonds de Commerce 
 French Law permits creditors to have mortgages (hypotec) on immoveables (real 
estate), but not on most moveables (chattels).  It does allow mortgages on cars, airplanes 
and ships on the basis that they are individually identifiable, because each has an 
identification number.  In addition, French law permits a creditor to have a mortgage on 
an entire business – or at least on some parts of it – a nantissement de fonds de 
commerce.  This mortgage covers the equipment and intellectual property rights of the 
business, but not its inventory or accounts.  It is registered in the Commercial Registries 
where the business, and any of its branches, are located.  Even though the debtor is in 
possession, the registration is sufficient publicity to give the first creditor priority over 
subsequent mortgage creditors. 
 However, there are several limitations on the mortgage creditors’ rights.  His 
rights are subordinate to perfected equipments liens, if the holder of the equipment 
hereon notified the mortgage creditor, and to wage and tax claims.  It may also be 
subordinate to a seller’s claims arising out of retention of title clause, and no notice of 
such clauses is required.  Further, the debtor may sell the equipment assets of the 
business, and a good faith purchaser will not be subject to the mortgage.  Finally, 
enforcement may only be through a sale of the assets by judicial auction.  The creditor 
may not take over the business or its assets, or attempt to sell them through normal 
commercial channels. 
 How well does this mortgage of a business stand up under the five-part functional 
analysis suggested above? 
1)  It does not cost a lot to create the nantissement de fonds de commerce, but it is 
very costly to create a non-possessory security interest which covers all of the assets of a 
small business.  The commercial usefulness of financing devices is usually measured by 
three subsidiary concepts:  Can the collateral be described generally?  Will the financing 
device cover after-acquired property?  And, will it apply to future advances?   
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The Nantissement covers all equipment and intellectual property rights, without 
having to describe each piece of equipment or right.  It also covers new equipment added 
to the business by the debtor – unless the new equipment is covered by an equipment lien 
(for which there is notice) or, perhaps, by a retention of title clause (for which there is no 
notice).  It also covers future advances, whether made pursuant to a commitment in the 
opening credit or not. 
 However, the French model does not allow the debtor to use this device to raise 
money using its inventory and accounts as collateral.  Thus, the amount of secured 
financing available is limited.  To use inventory as collateral, the retention of title device 
is available, but it is of limited utility.  First, it is available only to sellers, not to lenders.  
Second, the seller’s interest is cut off when the inventory is sold, and the seller has no 
priority interest in the proceeds of the sale.  To use accounts as collateral, French law 
assignment of an existing and identified account.  Thus, the accounts cannot be described 
generally, and accounts which arise after the creation of the credit agreement are not 
automatically covered, raising the costs of creating a security interest on this class of 
collateral. 
2)  Enforcement of the mortgage on a business is available if the debtor defaults 
on its obligations.  Such enforcement begins when the creditor initiates foreclosure 
proceedings in court, which can begin – eight days after the creditor has given the debtor 
notice of an accretion of default.  The court must make a determination of default and 
order the sale of the business through a judicial auction.  There are many possibilities for 
litigation during this process.  The debtor or third parties can dispute the sufficiency and 
timeliness of the notice, whether there was a default, the validity and enforceability of the 
mortgage, whether it was properly registered.  These may increase the cost of 
enforcement of the mortgage.   
 3)  What value will the creditor receive from the enforcement of this mortgage on 
a business?  There is always some uncertainty about valuing collateral.  The collateral 
may be difficult to appraise because it has a limited market or depreciates over time, or is 
subject to fashion or technological obsolescence.  At the time the loan is made, it may be 
difficult to determine the amount of value that will be obtained at a later sale after 
default, because a) market conditions can change, b) the mercantile expertise of the 
people running the sale may be limited, and c) the results of “distress sales” are 
somewhat unpredictable. 
 Under French law, the business is sold through a judicial auction, because court 
officers are the only persons allowed to sell property free and clear of prior 
encumbrances.  However, sales by court officers are recognized as “distress sales” and 
bring distress sale prices.  Normal commercial processes are not available, and thus the 
value obtained is not likely to be a normal commercial value.  Nor is the creditor allowed 
to simply take possession of the business, even under a court order.  Since the mortgage 
does not cover all the assets of the business, it is difficult to have a judicial sale of the 
business as a going concern.  Thus the value that the creditor will receive is not likely to 
be the “going concern” value of the business, but will be the distress sale value of some 
of its disaggregated assets – not very much. 
 4)  Will the secured party be protected against the claims of third parties, 
including other creditors’ bankruptcy official purchasers and statutory claimants?  If the 
creditor has registered its mortgage on the business in the proper Commercial Registry, 
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he will be protected against unsecured creditors and other creditors with such mortgages 
that register them later.  The creditor will also be protected from bankruptcy officials, but 
will be subject to super – priority claims, such as some wage claims and to tax claims 
having a special statutory priority.  The creditor will not be protected in many sales and 
purchases of equipment, however.  The debtor can sell assets, such as equipment, and the 
mortgage creditor will have no claim to either the assets sold or to their proceeds.  
Further, when replacement equipment is purchased, it may be subject to either an 
equipment lien or to retention of title clause.  A registered mortgage creditor’s claim is 
subject to a registered equipment lien, as long as notice e is given, and may also be 
subject to a title retention clause claim, for which neither registration nor notice is 
required. 
 5)  Can a prospective creditor determine, with certainty and little cost, before the 
loan is made, whether any other creditor will have a better claim to the collateral?  By 
checking the Commercial Registry, the prospective creditor can determine whether there 
are other creditors with a mortgage on the business who have registered before him and 
therefore have a better priority.  If there is one, he will stand first in line among that class 
of creditors.  However, the prospective creditor’s position and claims can be affected by 
subsequent actions of the debtor in buying and selling assets, especially equipment.  The 
prospective creditor can lose its entire interest through sale of the existing equipment, and 
it can have a subordinated interest in the newly – purchased equipment which replaces it.  
Such actions can be made into events of default by negative pledge clauses, but the 
creditor will still not have any priority interest in either the new equipment or the 
proceeds of the old equipment.  Finally, wage and tax claims are unpredictable.  Thus, the 
prospective creditor cannot be certain of its position in the future with respect to the 
assets being offered by the prospective debtor. 
IV.  The EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions 
The World Bank studies which detailed the positive effect of secured financing on 
a state’s economic activity induced the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD, or European Bank) to develop and publish a Model Law on 
Secured Transactions.  The EBRD has also carried on an active campaign to obtain 
enactment of this Model Law in Central and Eastern European countries.  The provisions 
of the Model Law create a “registered charge”, and many of its underlying concepts are 
similar to those of the English “floating charge”, which allows secured financing of 
corporations. 
 Unlike the French mortgage on a business, the EBRD registered charge can be 
sued to cover all of the important assets of a small business – its equipment, inventory, 
accounts and intellectual property rights.  In addition, each of these types of assets may 
be used separately or in the aggregate to support financing from many different lenders or 
from a single lender.  Registration of a “charge” on an asset or type of asset will give a 
prospective creditor priority over any lender who makes a later registration of a charge on 
the same assets.  However, the Model Law gives extensive protection to “trade creditors” 
who sell goods on credit to the debtor, and they may be able to defeat the interest of an 
existing registered charge. 
 How well does the EBRD registered charge stand up under the five – part 
functional analysis set forth in Part I of this paper? 
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1)  It does not cost a lot to create an enforceable registered charge.  The Model 
Law allows collateral to be described generally, to include after-acquired property, and to 
apply to future advances.  It requires the registration of a “registration statement” which 
may be a different document than the credit agreement between the parties (the “charging 
instrument”).  This is an important feature, allowing the parties to give public notice of 
the existence of their secured transaction and identify the parties, the collateral, and the 
secured debt.  The collateral may be described either generally or specifically.  If 
generally described, it can include after-acquire property conforming to the general 
description.  The secured debt may also be described either generally or specifically and 
this allows a generally described debt to include future advances up to a stipulated 
maximum amount. 
The registration system is only outlined in the Model Law.  A lender needs to 
obtain from the debtor a signed charging instrument and a signed registration statement.  
Each document is simple, and registration is straightforward.  The registrar may reject a 
registration statement if it “does not comply with the requirements of the” the Model Law 
and those requirements have been kept simple.  They basically require only the 
“identification” of the parties to the transaction, the secured debt and the charged 
property.  However, there may be a problem relating to registration fees.  Stamp taxes can 
exceed 2%, and are commonly levied on all registrations of “floating charges” in 
England.  This can be a significant cost barrier which inhibits the use of secured 
financing.  The Model Law does not require that registration fees because limited to the 
actual cost of registration, rather than being regarded as a revenue source. 
2)  Does it cost a lot to enforce a security interest?  After a default, the secured 
creditor must first deliver an “enforcement notice” to the debtor, and then register that 
enforcement notice within seven days.  The deliver and registration of the enforcement 
notice entitles the secured creditor both to take “protective measure” and to “realize the 
charge.”  “Protective measures” include taking possession of the charged property, using 
a “[bailiff]” to take possession, immobilizing it, or any “measures as agreed with the 
chargor.”  This structure provides many possibilities for litigation, and the delay and 
uncertainty created by litigation.  The debtor or third parties can seek court intervention 
to declare the enforcement notice invalid, resole disputes between debtor and creditor 
over the creation, validity and enforceability of the charge, resolve priority disputes 
between secured creditors, determine whether improper protection measures were taken, 
order “appropriate” protection measures, and invalidate clauses in the charging 
instrument. 
To summarize, the Model Law takes many steps to reduce enforcement costs.  
After a default, the secured creditor delivers an enforcement notice to the debtor, then 
registers it.  The creditor is then permitted to take possession voluntarily or to immobilize 
the collateral.  If the debtor resists, the secured creditor can obtain the assistance of a 
“[bailiff]” without first obtaining a court order.  The debtor does have many opportunities 
to litigate several aspects of this process.  The secured creditor may obtain further 
enforcement devices by stipulating them in the contract. 
3) Does enforcement of the security interest provide real commercial value for the 
creditor?  Under the Model Law, the secured creditor controls the manner of the sale of 
the collateral, but is required to realize a “fair price.”  This will probably lead to 
realization of greater value than under the French system, where court enforcement 
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officers usually are the only persons allowed to sell property free and clear of prior 
encumbrances.  This provision of the Model Law will permit use of the private sector to 
seek prices closer to market value.  The sales by court officers are recognized as “distress 
sales” and bring distress sale prices.  Under the Model Law, normal commercial 
processes will be available, and can bring normal commercial (albeit wholesale) prices. 
However, it is not until sixty days after delivery of the enforcement notice, that 
the secured creditor may sell the collateral.  The effect of the delay if the charged 
property is fresh produce, fish, trendy clothes, or a volatile stock would be unfortunate 
for both creditor and debtor.  A new bureaucracy called a “proceeds depository” is 
created to disburse the sale proceeds.  A buyer of the repossessed collateral gets good title 
only if the sale proceeds are paid into the proceeds depository. 
Thus, in realizing value, the Model Law is helpful in permitting the secured 
creditor to control any sale of the collateral, so that it can maximize the value received if 
it chooses to do so.  There are two major restrictions in the Model Law on any such sales.  
One is that the sale cannot occur until sixty days after the enforcement notice is delivered.  
The value of the charged property could fall rapidly during that period for a wide variety 
of reasons.  The second is that a bureaucracy called a Proceeds Depository is created, and 
usually must be sued, and its costs may reduce the value received by the secured creditor. 
4)  Is the secured creditor protected against claims of third parties, including other 
creditors, bankruptcy officials, purchasers and statutory claimants?  The Model Law 
provides a concrete set of rules to determine priority among creditors.  A secured creditor 
which registers its charge is protected against subsequent registered secured creditors.  
The non-possessory registered charge gives public notice of the encumbrance over the 
collateral.  Thus, among registered secured creditors, there is no problem with “secret 
encumbrances”.  However, not all charges need to be registered under the EBRD Model 
Law, and these unregistered charges can have a “super-priority” which will defeat the 
interests of the registered secured creditor.  One such exception is the “unpaid vendor’s 
charge”; another is the possessory charge. (discussed under Question 5) 
The unpaid vendor’s charge is an unregistered title retention device.  Usually it 
protects creditors who sell goods on credit, but not creditors who lend money.  The 
former offer credit which is “tied” to sales only of their products, and which is usually 
only short term credit.  On the other hand, under an effective secured financing system, 
the latter can provide long-term financing for all necessary costs of starting an enterprise. 
Under the EBRD Model Law, an “unpaid vendor” obtains an unregistered charge 
which gives that vendor priority over all registered charges.  The unpaid vendor gets such 
priority (a superpriority) whether it registers the charge or not, and whether its charge 
arises before or after registration of other charges.  There is no public disclosure of the 
existence of the unpaid vendor’s charge, so it is a secret encumbrance from the 
perspective of any potential lender of funds.  An unregistered “unpaid vendor’s charge” 
lasts for six months or until the vendor is paid.  It can be converted into a registered 
charge at any time during those six months.  A creditor who is an unregistered unpaid 
vendor has all the enforcement powers of a registered secured creditor. 
If collateral is sold, the secured creditor does not automatically have any interest 
in the sale proceeds.  However, the Model Law offers effective protection against 
purchasers of goods covered by a charge because buyers of collateral will hold the 
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collateral subject to a registered charge, unless they are a buyer of inventory from a 
merchant.  That is the balance struck in most viable secured financing systems. 
5)  Can potential secured creditors determine, with certainty and at little cost, 
before the loan is made, whether any other creditor will have a better claim to the 
collateral?  Under the EBRD Model Law, between “registered charges,” the first to be 
registered has priority over all other registered charges, regardless of the actual 
knowledge by later secured creditors concerning prior registration.  Thus, the doctrine of 
constructive notice is applied to all creditors who obtain a registered charge.  Such 
registered creditors will need to check the registry to determine whether there are any 
prior registered charges or risk having only a secondary priority to the collateral. 
However, the combination of on registration of the unpaid vendor’s charge and its 
superiority over registered charges causes problems to the secured transactions system 
created by the EBRD Model Law.  One problem is that no lender with a mere registered 
charge can grant a debtor any real security value for the debtor’s inventory unless the 
lender is willing to supervise the debtor’s purchasing and bookkeeping operations to 
ensure actual payment of all suppliers.  This would be very labor-intensive and increase 
the cost of inventory secured financing unreasonably.  The same is probably true for 
loans no the debtor’s equipment, although probably less labor-intensive and costly. 
Thus, registered secured creditors such are mere lenders and not sellers of goods 
have only subordinate rights to inventory and equipment.  Tat should make them hesitant 
to enter into the type of long-term, general purpose financing arrangements which can 
arise under secured transactions legislation.  On the other hand, “trade creditors” and 
other credit sellers are well protected and should be expected to increase their sales and 
credit activity. 
The “possessory charge” is the traditional pledge, but under the Model Law there 
are new twists to the doctrines and new problems.  Almost every jurisdiction recognizes 
the security interest in which the creditor receives physical possession of the collateral 
from the debtor. However, the Model Law does not require any physical delivery by the 
debtor of the charged property to the creditor to create a possessory charge (even though 
the property must be ”capable of delivery”).  Instead, the Model Law allows the use of 
constructive possession, which may be held by “a person nominated by the creditor.”  
Such statutory language could be used by a well-advised creditor to avoid registration 
and its incumbent fees and to use a simple agreement which nominates the debtor as the 
agreed person to hold possession.  Thus, the Model Law’s possessory charge subverts the 
non-possessory registered charge both because it provides a substitute which is too 
widely usable, and because it promotes secret encumbrances which destroys the heart of 
the registration system. 
The EBRD Model Law is really a tale of two different kinds of creditors, credit 
sellers and lenders, which are given different status and rights.  To understand the 
problems, a distinction must be made between these two types of creditors.   A bank is a 
lender of money to a debtor, but a manufacturer becomes a creditor by selling goods on 
credit and becoming (in the word of the Model Law) an “unpaid vendor.”  The bank or 
other lender will get its rights to the collateral from the debtor through the secured 
financing agreement.  The credit seller (unpaid vendor) will get its rights to the collateral 
by “retaining tile” to the collateral when it is sold and delivered to the debtor.  Lenders 
have two costly choices: 1) to try to re-arrange the transaction so as to pass title through 
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them; or 2) to supervise the debtor’s financial operations enough to ensure payment of all 
trade creditors. 
A credit seller can determine, before shipping goods to the debtor, that its claim to 
the charged property will have priority over those of all other creditors, because of the 
first to file priority rule.  It cannot check the registration files and be certain whether there 
are any credit sellers with unpaid vendor’s charges which have priority over its claims to 
inventory or to equipment, because those charges need not be registered; in effect they 
are secret liens. 
The economic effect is likely to be that lenders either will not attribute any serious 
value to inventory or equipment as charged property, or they will have extra costs and 
risks in obtaining charges on such property, and these will be passed on to the debtor.  
Under the first approach, lenders will take charges on inventory and equipment, but will 
not reduce rates or make more credit available because of the problematic nature of nay 
actual economic recovery from such property.  Such use of secured credit would not be 
cost effective. 
Under the second approach, lenders could require the debtor to engage in periodic 
“pay-out and pay-over” transactions to obtain protection from unpaid vendors’ charges, 
but such transactions are labor-intensive, costly, and not a cost-effective use of secured 
financing.  Alternatively, lenders could devote much time and energy toward designing 
transactions are labor-intensive, costly, and not a cost-effective use of secured financing.  
Alternatively, lenders could devote much time and energy toward designing transactions 
which route “title” through them to the debtor, using bills of lading and other devises.  
The law of conditional sales and trust receipts has numerous examples of success and 
failure of such attempts.  But these transactions, while imaginative, are not only risky but 
also costly, and should be eschewed if possible. 
V. The North American “Security Interest” 
The North American Model takes a different approach, covering all types of 
assets and all types of creditors under one statute, and expressing an equal preference for 
both credit sellers and lenders.  The “security interest” covers all of a small business’s 
assets, including equipment, inventory, accounts and intellectual property.  Financing 
transactions in accounts are covered whether they are assignments of the accounts or 
sales.  The first secured creditor to register its interest has priority over all other lenders.   
 Credit sellers are given a super-priority, but must register a public notice of their 
security interest within 20 days, and credit sellers of the debtor’s inventory must notify 
all creditors who have registered their security interests before the sale.  Enforcement is 
available through self-help repossession and through commercial sales which can be 
controlled by the creditor.  However, the sale process must be “fair”, and courts can judge 
the fairness of the process after the sale. 
 How well does this security interest stand up under the five-part functional 
analysis set forth in Part I of this paper? 
 1)  It does not cost a lot to create an enforceable security interest which covers all 
of the assets of a small business?  The collateral may be described generally, include 
after-acquired property and apply to future advances, with no required statement of a 
maximum amount.  It requires filing of a “financing statement” in a public register, and 
that is a different document than the secured loan agreement itself.  The fee for filing a 
financing statement is between $10 and $30 in most states, and it protects the secured 
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creditor for five years.  The filing is purely an administrative matter, handled by clerks, 
and not subject to a review by judicial personnel. 
 2)  Does it cost a lot to enforce the security interest?  After a default, the secured 
party may exercise its rights either through judicial processes, such as a foreclosure 
action, or through non-judicial processes.  Non-judicial processes include self-help 
repossession of inventory, rendering equipment unusable, and notifying account debtors 
to pay the secured creditor directly, rather than pay the debtor. .  If the debtor objects to 
self-help repossession, the secured creditor must seek the assistance of a bailiff or other 
court official.  Litigation concerning the exercise of these rights usually occurs after the 
rights have been exercised.  Thus, the secured creditor can usually exercise its rights 
quickly without great cost. 
 The second half of this enforcement scenario is the sale of the collateral.  The 
secured creditor has control of this sale, but must act carefully.  The sale must be 
“commercially reasonable” in all aspects – time, place, manner, advertising, etc. – and all 
of this may be reviewed by a court after-the-fact.  Thus, the secured creditor usually uses 
well-known commercial channels to sell the collateral, and they can be expensive. 
 3)  Does enforcement of the security interest provide real commercial value for 
the creditor?  The secured creditor controls the manner of the sale of the collateral, and 
will use normal commercial channels for that sale.  This will usually realize greater value 
than the French system, where court enforcement officers are usually the only persons 
allowed to sell property free and clear of prior encumbrances.  Although this sale process 
is more expensive, it uses the private sector to seek prices closer to market value.  The 
increase in sale price by using the private sector is believed to be greater than the costs of 
using commercial channels for the sale. 
 In sum, the North American model has two aspects in the enforcement of security 
interests after default.  One is self-help repossession, the other is creditor control of the 
sale of the collateral.  Self-help repossession is probably not exportable to other parts of 
the world, but it is also less necessary in business financing.  Voluntary repossession and 
resort to bailiffs and other court officials are usually adequate substitutes where the 
debtor is a business.  The much more important aspect of the North American model is 
the secured creditor control of the sale of the collateral, which allows the creditor to use 
the private sector to seek prices closer to market value than the “distress sale” prices 
usually available through a judicial auction. 
 4)  Is the secured creditor protected against the claims of third parties, including 
other creditors, bankruptcy officials, purchases and statutory claimants?  The North 
American model sets forth a very complicated set of rules to determine priority among 
creditors.  However, most of the complications arise out of specialized rules for 
agricultural loans, or loans where the collateral is “fixtures” or letters of credit rights or 
negotiable instruments.  The rules for most ordinary secured loans are relatively simple.  
A secured creditor which registers its interest is protected against secured creditors who 
register later.  There are two major exceptions, one for “purchase money security 
interests” (PMSI) which are used to finance the acquisition of a new asset.  The other is 
for possessory security interests (e.g., a pledge). 
 A PMSI includes both credit given by a credit seller and credit given by a lender, 
if it is actually used to acquire collateral.  It will have “super-priority” over a registered 
secured creditor, but only if it also is registered at the time of delivery or within 20 days 
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thereafter.  In addition, a PMSI secured creditor who sells goods which will become part 
of the debtor’s inventory must notify all registered secured creditors of their intent to 
finance the debtor before the debtor receives the goods.  Thus, although the registered 
secured creditor is subordinate to PMSIs, they are on notice of the existence of the 
PMSIs, either through a notification or through constructive notice. 
 Unsecured creditors are subordinate to a registered security interest, but not to an 
unregistered one.  Bankruptcy officials have the same priority as a secured creditor who 
registers on the date the bankruptcy is field, so a secured creditor who registers before 
that date is protected.  Wage claimants have no statutory priority, nor do tax claims.  The 
tax authorities may register their claims, however, and be treated as secured creditors 
with priority dating from the time of their registration. 
 Purchasers of most collateral take subject to a registered security interest, and the 
secured creditor also has an interest in the proceeds of the sale – so it is doubly protected.  
There is an exception where the secured creditor has agreed to the sale, and this applies to 
sales of inventory.  Thus, buyers of inventory take free and clear of even a registered 
security interest. 
 5)  Can potential secured creditors determine, with certainty and at little cost, 
before the loan is made, whether any other creditor will have a better claim to the 
collateral?  Under the “first to file” rule, the first security interest to be filed has priority 
over most other security interests.  This is true, regardless of the actual knowledge by 
later secured creditors concerning prior registration, through the doctrine of constructive 
knowledge.  Thus, a potential secured creditor can determine its priority by checking the 
register for “financing statements” already registered. 
 If there are none, the potential creditor will have priority over everyone – except 
possible PMSIs and possessory security interests.  However, the exception for 
unregistered PMSIs will only apply to goods received with in the last 20 days.  The PMSI 
creditor must register a “financing statement” covering its security interest within 20 days 
of delivery, or lose its “super-priority”. 
 A possessory security interest (pledge) takes priority from the time the secured 
creditor takes possession.  Thus, from the viewpoint of the potential secured creditor, it 
will have priority over pledges for all equipment and inventory in the physical possession 
of the debtor at the time it registers its security interest.  It will not lose that priority, even 
if the goods are pledged and delivered to another creditor later.  It will not have priority 
only as to goods not in the debtor’s possession, but already in the possession of a pledgee, 
at the time the security interest is registered.  Thus, the potential creditor, in addition to 
checking the register, must also inquire about any goods received in the past 20 days and 
any goods not physically present at the debtor’s premises. 
 The potential debtor may lose priority over inventory sold, but it will continue to 
have a priority interest in the proceeds from the sale of inventory.  It could also lose 
priority over new equipment and inventory acquired during the term of the loan due to 
PMSIs, but it will have either actual or constructive knowledge of these transactions.  It 
can prevent such transactions by putting a “negative pledge” clause in the loan 
agreement, if it did not want the debtor to dilute the security interest. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 The French model “nantissement de fonds de commerce” is a security device 
which grants rights in equipment and intellectual property of a small business to the 
creditor.  It does not cost much to create or enforce, although enforcement is subject to 
many possibilities for litigation.  However, the value received from enforcement may be 
greatly reduced because the sale is through a judicial auction at “distress sale” prices, and 
because only parts of the business will be sold.  
 The secured creditor which registers its interest will be protected against 
unsecured creditors, bankruptcy officials and other mortgage - holders who register later.  
However it will not be protected against sales of the equipment to buyers, nor will it have 
a priority interest in the proceeds of the sale; and it may not have any interest in the 
replacement equipment.  Further, it can be subject to statutory priorities for wage and tax 
claims.  It will not receive either actual or constructive notice of the potential sales, or of 
the security interests in replacement equipment, or of wage or tax claims, so it cannot 
accurately plan for these contingencies.  
 The result of this lack of notice of other interests and the realization of reduced 
value on enforcement of the secured creditor’s interests is that the secured creditor is not 
likely to value its interest in the collateral very highly.  Thus, although the secured 
creditor will take a nantissement de fonds de commerce, it is not likely to give the debtor 
much value for it.  The loan costs, amount and duration are not likely to be significantly 
different than those for an unsecured loan to the same debtor.  
 The EBRD Model “registered charge” is a security device which covers all the 
assets of a small business—equipment, inventory, accounts receivable and intellectual 
property.  It does not cost much to create or enforce.  A secured creditor can obtain 
voluntary repossession, immobilize collateral or obtain a bailiff’s assistance without a 
court order, although enforcement is subject to many possibilities for litigation.  The 
creditor controls the resale of the collateral, so that it is possible to realize actual 
commercial wholesale value of the collateral.  The courts can review the resale to 
determine whether “fair value” was, in fact, realized.  
 The secured creditor which registers its charge will be protected against 
unsecured creditors, bankruptcy officials and other lenders who register later.  It will also 
be protected against purchasers of collateral, except for buyers of inventory.  However, it 
will not be protected against trade creditors who sell goods to the debtor on credit.  They 
are given a priority interest for six months without registering their interest or notifying 
the registered secured creditor, and can extend that priority interest by registering it six 
months after delivery of the goods.  These are also potential problems for the lender with 
regard to pledges, where possession is technically in the hands of a third party.  
The result is that the registered charge does realize value for secured creditors at with 
little cost, but there is a question as to which creditors will receive that value.  The trade 
creditor receives a “super-priority” for six months with no actual or constructive notice to 
other lenders of its interest.  This should make the general lenders wary of assuming that 
their interests in the collateral are valuable.  Thus, the small business under the EBRD 
Model will probably be liable to obtain credit from sellers, but not from more general 
lenders.  This system will give some sellers a partial monopoly over credit transactions, 
and could lead them to impose monopoly pricing on their credit.  
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 The North American Model “security interest” is a security device which covers 
all of the assets of a small business.  It does not cost much to create ($10 to $30) or to 
enforce.  It allows self-help repossession, which is probably not an exportable concept; 
but it also allows voluntary repossession, direct collection from account debtors, etc., and 
so is not dependent on self-help repossession.  It also allows the creditor to control the 
resale of the collateral, so that it is possible to realize actual commercial wholesale value 
of the collateral.  The courts can review the sale process used in the resale for its 
“commercial reasonableness”, but cannot second – guess the price actually realized.  
The secured creditor which registers its interest will be protected against unsecured 
creditors, bankruptcy officials and other lenders who register later.  It will also be 
protected against purchasers of collateral, except for buyers of inventory, and will also 
have a priority interest in identifiable proceeds of any sale.  However, it will be subject to 
sellers who sell to the debtor on credit, but only if the credit seller registers its interest 
(giving constructive notice) within 20 days of the delivery of the goods to the debtor, and 
for credit sales of goods that become the debtor’s inventory, give notice to the registered 
secured creditor before delivery.  
 The result is that the registered security interest realizes real value to the secured 
creditor with little cost.  Because of the requirements on credit sellers for actual and 
constructive notice to all registered creditors, lenders can effectively “police” their loans 
and prevent unwanted dilution of their security interests.  In turn, that allows lenders and 
credit sellers to compete evenly for the business of debtors, and that competition will 
effectively reduce the costs of credit.  In that manner, debtors are most likely to realize 
actual value for their collateral when they borrow. 
